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2.1  Introduction 
From its beginnings, the fiscal system of the United States has been 
committed to the principle that multiple layers of  government is the 
preferred structure for the financing and provision of government ser- 
vices. The U.S. Constitution through the Tenth Amendment expressly 
protects the rights of states to pursue their own fiscal agendas provided 
those agendas do not conflict with clearly legislated federal objectives 
or constitutionally protected individual rights.  I  Most state constitutions 
through charters for the creation of  local governments offer similar 
protections for the fiscal activities of cities, counties, and special dis- 
tricts.* While the rules for defining the domains of fiscal decisions are 
reasonably  clear,  the exact contents of these domains are not.  Our 
federalist fiscal structure is an evolving structure, changing in response 
to the demands upon it for the provision of public goods. This paper 
will  examine the most recent phase of this evolutionary process: the 
recent centralization in the financing of  the state and local provision 
of public  service^.^ 
Robert P.  Inman is a professor of finance, economics, and public management at the 
University of Pennsylvania and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
The ideas in this paper were originally presented in a series of classes given at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School in a research seminar taught jointly with Pro- 
fessor Michael Fitts, and sponsored by the Law School’s Institute of Law and Economics. 
An initial draft of the paper was given at the NBER Conference on Fiscal  Federalism; 
the comments of my discussant, Tom Romer, and other participants at the conference 
were most helpful in preparing this current version.  I wish to thank the NBER and the 
Mellon  Foundation (through the PARSS grant to the  University of Pennsylvania) for 
financial support and Mr. David Albright for providing his usual high level of research 
assistance. 
33 Table 2.1  The Growth of All Government Spending 
Federal plus State plus Local Government Spending on:. 
Year 
Total  (% of Personal  Defense  Transfers to Persons  Goods and Services 
Income) 





























































Annual Rate of 
Growth, 1902  2.96%  3.61%  6.65% 
to 1985 
2.70% 
Sources: All government spending data for the period 1902 to 1970 are from Bureau of Census, 1975, Historical 
Statistics ofthe United  Stutes, Series Y605-637,  Y682-709:  data for the year 1980 are from Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 1984, National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), 1929- 1982, Tables 3.2 and 3.  I: data for the year 
1985 are from Bureau of  Economic Analysis, July  1986, Survey ofcurrent Businen, Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The 
price deflator for government goods and services, for defense spending, and for total government spending is 
the implicit price deflator for all government. Sources are the Bureau of Census, 1975, Historical Sratistics for 
the period  1932-1970,  Series El-22: the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1984, NIPA, 1929-1982,  Table 7.6, for 
1980; and the Bureau of  Economic Analysis, July 1986, Survey of Current Business, Table 7.6, for 1985. For the 
period 1902-1932,  the GNP  price deflator for government services was assumed to have the same rate of change 
as the “all  items”  CPI, from Historical  Stutistics, p. 21 I. The price deflator for transfers to persons was the 
implicit GNP  price deflator, available from Historical Statistics for 1902-  1970, Series El-22, from the NIPA for 
1980, Table 7.6, and from the Survey of Current Business, July  1986, Table 7.6, for 1985. 
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Tables 2.1-2.3  reveal the basic trends. Three central facts stand out. 
First,  total  federal,  state, and local government spending has  been 
increasing  steadily  over this  century,  both  in  real  dollars and  as a 
percentage of  national income (table 2.1).  The major components of 
this growth are federal outlays for defense (growing at 3.61 percent per 
annum since 1902), government direct transfers to persons (growing at 
6.65 percent per annum), and governments’ direct provision of goods 
and services (growing at 2.70 percent per annum). Second, state and 
local governments are the main producers of nondefense, nontransfer 
public goods (Table 2.2). Finally, there is a decided trend towards the 
centralized financing of  these state and local services (table 2.3). At 
both the state and local levels the trend is to move the revenue decision 
upward  to a higher level of  government. Note  however,  that at the 
same time we have centralized the financing of state and local services 
the spending and production decisions have remained at the state and 
local level. While financing has become centralized, provision decisions 
have remained localized. 
The move of our fiscal system towards the centralized financing of 
local services is not a new phenomenon. The federal government has 
always provided aid to the states, and states have always given fiscal 
assistance to their l~calities.~  What is new-at  least since 1960-is  the 
dollar volume of such assistance and its rapid growth. The story behind 
Table 2.2  Federal and State-Local Governments’ Provision of Nondefense 
Public Goods and Services. 
Year  Total  Federal  State-Local  (State-Local’s 














































Sources: Expenditure data for 1902-1970 are from the Bureau of Census, 1975, Historical 
Stutistics  of  the  United States, Series Y605,  Y682-709;  for 1980 from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 1984, National Income and Product Accounts, Tables 3.2 and 3.3; 
for 1985, Bureau of  Economic Analysis, July 1986, Survey of Current Business, Tables 
3.2 and 3.3. The price deflator is the implicit price deflator for all government; see Table 
2.1  for references. 
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this important change is both economic and political. Economic in that 
fundamental demographic and economic changes have acted to increase 
the demand for state and local services in this period. Political in that 
local officials have argued, and Congress has eventually agreed, that 
it would be politically advantageous to finance this expansion by means 
of federal grants-in-aid. Growing economic pressure for local services 
and the political attractiveness  of  centralized  financing are the  root 
causes of our new federalist fiscal order. 
2.2  The Evolving Structure of  Federal Assistance 
Historically, the federal government has always supported state and 
local governments: federal aid is not a new idea. The early land grants 
to  states for purposes  of  education,  railway expansion,  and public 
infrastructure development were sizeable, often constituting 20 percent 
or more of the land area of the recipient ~tate.~  Dollar grants appeared 
for the first time as a significant transfer to states with the passage of 
the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 and the approval of the Smith-Hughes 
Act of  1917.6 The 1930s marked the next major expansion of federal 
assistance for state and local governments. The largest single source 
of  these new monies was a variety of  federal public relief programs 
including the first federal program for unemployment relief.’  Each of 
these  new  relief  programs  contained  (sometimes implicit) matching 
provisions which rewarded states with more assistance as they spent 
more on public welfare. 
Yet  each  of  these  two previous  periods  of  aid  expansion  pale  in 
comparison to the growth in federal assistance for state and local gov- 
ernments from 1960 to 1980. During this period real federal aid to the 
states more than doubled in dollar amounts and by  1980 had become 
almost 27  percent of all state revenues (see table 2.3, columns 3 and 
4). Just  as importantly, direct  federal  to  local  assistance-virtually 
nonexistent before 1960-became  a major source of local government 
dollars accounting for just under  14 percent of  all  local revenues by 
1980. The 1960-80 aid explosion had an important impact on the federal 
budget  as  well.  Federal  assistance  to  state  and  local  governments 
amounted to only 10.5 percent of all federal nondefense spending and 
6.96 percent of all federal spending on goods and services in 1950, but 
by 1980 those percentages had risen to 19.75 percent of all nondefense 
spending and 3  1.27 percent of all federal goods and service spending.8 
By  1980 all levels of government in our federalist fiscal system had an 
important  stake  in  the  structure of  federal  aid  for  state and  local 
governments. 
What has caused this fundamental transformation of our fiscal sys- 
tem? We  might well hope that it was done by design and for a compelling Table 2.3  Financing State and Local Government- 
State Governments  Local Governments 
Federal Aid  Federal  + State 
Year  Total  Own  Federal  as % of Total  Total  Own  Federal  State  Aid as % of 
Revenue  Revenue  Aid  Revenue  Revenue  Revenue  Aid  Aid  Total Revenue 


















43 I  .77 
535.90 
626.22 
















































































Sources: All aid and revenue data for the three period  1902-1970  are from Bureau of  Census, 1975, Historical Statistics ofthe United 
Srares, pp. 1129-1 132. Data for the period  1971-1985 are from various issues of  Bureau of Census, Governmental Finances, published 
annually. The price deflator is the implicit price deflator for all government; see Table 2.1 for references. 
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public purpose, and, indeed, there are good reasons for federal assis- 
tance to the state and local sector. Four separate arguments for inter- 
governmental grants-in-aid have been offered in the literature, three of 
which make the case for assistance from the perspective of economic 
efficiency and  one of  which argues for governmental  aid  to insure 
increased economic equity. 
First, to achieve efficiency, grants-in-aid may be necessary to induce 
state and local governments to provide the appropriate level of a na- 
tional public good; national public infrastructures or a minimum level 
of  public education to insure a literate citizenry are examples. Such 
goods may be financed and produced  by  the central government or 
they may be financed centrally and then (via aid) produced by the state 
or local government. Second, federal government grants to local gov- 
ernments may  be necessary to encourage the efficient level of  local 
public goods when those goods display a signijicant level of  spillovers- 
positive or negative-beyond  the boundaries of  the local political ju- 
risdiction. Third, grants-in-aid can be used to induce a ruling political 
coalition (e.g., the median voter or a protected agenda-setter) to expand 
or contract its preferred level of a locally provided public good to more 
closely approximate that level required to achieve within-community 
allocative efficiency. Finally, federal aid to state and local units can be 
used to insure a more equitable distribution  of economic resources. 
While most economists agree that income redistribution across house- 
holds should be a federal function, redistributive  grants can  still be 
used to insure a more equitable distribution of  meritorious, or ethically 
“primary,”  local public goods. Education is the leading example of 
such a commodity, and recent court decisions in California, New Jer- 
sey, and New York have embraced this argument and have explicitly 
required their states to redesign their school aid formulas to encourage 
a more equitable provision of this public good. Each of these efficiency 
and equity arguments offers a potentially compelling case for federal 
to state-local  grant^.^ If national needs, spillovers, political inefficien- 
cies, or local service inequities have grown over the past thirty years, 
then so too should the level of federal to state-local aid. 
It is instructive, therefore, to examine the actual distribution of fed- 
eral grants against the standards implied by these typical public finance 
arguments for federal assistance. Does the distribution of federal aid 
conform to the dictates of the normative theory for fiscal assistance?’O 
Table 2.4 attempts to answer this question for each of the major cat- 
egories of federal-to-state and federal-to-local grants-in-aid. 
The results in  table 2.4 show the correlation of  the level of  aid in 
each  of  five benchmark  years  to variables  which  might  reasonably 
approximate an efficiency or equity argument for federal assistance. 
Each regression includes at least one variable which might plausibly 
be  argued  to  proxy  for each  of  the  three  efficiency arguments; the Table 2.4  Federal Aid to State-Local Governments, 1950-1984. 
(I)  Federal Aid to States: In(Education) 
Within-Government 
Allocalive Efficiency  Equity 
Mean  Coeff. of  National Purpose  Spillovers  Own 
Year  ($1  Variation  % 2  HS  %OutM  %OLD  PuKids  PrKids  CVY  InY  Spending  R2 
1952  3.40  SO7  .632 
(I  ,217) 
[ -  .28*] 
1962  6.16  .589  3.301 
(2.447) 
L.241 
1972  28.55  ,325  -  1.712* 
(.912) 
[-.39*] 
1977  28.16  ,268  -  1.293 
(.94) 
[ -  .33*] 
1984  22.92  .22  I  -  ,601 
(.438) 









-  1.26 




[ -  .55*1 
~  3.059 
(5.713) 
1.021 
~  ,643 
(2.787) 
[  ~  .30*1 
-  1.770 
(2.811) 
[ -  ,221 
-  3.3SO* 
(I  .917) 
[ -  .29*] 
(ma.) 
(n.a.) 
-  .005 
(.004) 
[  ~  .56*] 
-  ,005 
(.004) 
[ -  .48*] 
,002 
(.004) 















[ -  ,201 
,486 
(.478) 
[-  .45*1 
.019 
(302) 
[ -  ,021 
-  ,985" 
(.429) 
[  ~  .62*1 
-  .958* 
(.479) 
[ -  .54*1 






















































































 Table 2.4  (continued) 
(3) Federal Aid to States: In(Welfare) 
Within-Government  Equity  Own 
Mean  Coeff. of  National  Purpose  Spillovers  Allocative  Efficiency  Spending 
Year  ($)  Variation  96  2  HS  %oPov  %B/k  CVY  InY  In(We/)  R' 
1952  11.14  ,492  -  ,439 
(S72) 
[-.211 
1962  17.24  .498  I .735* 
(.774) 
[ -  .40*1 
1972  45.05  ,373  -  1.284 
(I ,027) 
[-.21] 
1977  45.90  ,339  -  ,689 
[-.OI] 
(1.325) 













-  1.475 
(2.448) 
[ -  .03] 
,268 
(.316) 
[.  101 






-  .005 
(.696) 
[ -  ,071 





-  ,061 











[.  171 
-  .469* 
(.154) 
[ -  .28*] 
.407 
(.320) 
[ -  .46*I 
-  .846* 
(.482) 
L.031 
-  .907 
(.614) 




.837*  ,893 
(.049) 
.848*  ,937 
(.045) 
.729'  ,788 
(.064) 
.490*  .620 
(.063) 
.490x  ,656 
(.O6l) Table 2.4  (continued) 
(4) Federal Aid to States: Mother) 
Within-Government 
Allocative  Efficiency  Equity 
Mean  Coeff. of  National  Purpose  Spillovers  Own 
Year  ($)  Variation  PDen  NHousc  %OulM  GDcn  YGrow  CVY  InY  Spending  R* 
1952  4.51  1.393  -  .273  (n.a.)  (n.a.)  -8.122*  -4.386  -  ,291 
(.587)  (2.397)  (3.1 15)  (.429) 
r-.171  [ -  .25*1  [.lo]  r-.~ 
I962  6.96  1.176  -  .Ol4  (n.a.1  (n.a.)  -5.593*  -  3.430  -  .556 
(2.972)  (5.889)  (.642) 
1 -  .27*1  r-.z7*1  [-.MI 
(367) 
[-.I81 
1972  16.12  ,684  -  1.213 
(.847) 
1.211 
1977  29.01  ,643  264 
(I  .047) 
-.I27 
(.096) 
-  .24*] 
,017 
(.195) 
[-.I81  r -  .21i 
1984  25.06  ,957  .26  I  -  .012 
[-.Ill  [-.I31 
(.997)  (.136) 
7.659* 










[ -  .27*] 
-  ,573 
(2.681) 










-  9.085 
(5.933) 










1.505*  -  ,303 
(.506) 
r.151 
.294  -  .  I62 
(.574) 
-  .08] 
1.294*  -  .552 
(.597) 
-  ,201 
-  1.504*  -  ,436 
(.691) 
[-.is] 
-1.231  -  .239 
(.844) 
[ -  .08] Table 2.4  (continued) 
(5)  Federal Aid to States: In(Revenue-Sharing) 
Within-Government 
Allocative Efficiency  Equity 
Mean  Coeff. of  National Purpose  Spillovers  Own 
Year  ($)  Variation  TElris  %OutM  PDcn  VAMin  SLExp  CVY  InY  Spending  R? 
1972  7.19  ,220  -  ,033  -  I .485*  ,018  .000  .0011*  .405*  -l.h15*  ,552 
(mo)  (.703)  (.122)  (.o(H1)  (.0003)  (.I531  (.301)  - 
[.  161  [ -  .02l  [ -  .  I91 
(.054)  (.487)  (.n82)  (.nnn)  (.0002)  (.ios)  (.212)  - 
[.35*1  [-.Sl*]  I.211  [-.011 
1977  6.37  ,171  -  ,034  -  2.259*  .048  .000  .0010*  .228*  -  l.437*  ,663 
[.25*]  [ -  .29*]  [.OSl  [-.(Ill  [.I71  [.36*]  [ -  .43*] 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1984  0  0 Table 2.4  (continued) 
(6)  Federal Aid to  Local: In(All Categorical) 
National  Purpose  Within-Government  Equity 
Mean  Coeff. of  Spillovers  Allocative Efficiency  Own 
Year  ($)  Variation  %urh  %Dc~"  Age  GDcn  %OurM  CVY  InY  Spending  R? 
1957  2.69  .793  5.370* 
(1.249) 
r.081 
1962  5.22  ,517  1.209 
(.975) 
[.I51 
1972  16.59  ,374  1.921* 
(.483) 
[.34*1 
1977  28.63  ,348  I .654* 
(.419) 
[.52*1 
1984  24.04  ,289  ,415 
(.383) 
[.39*1 
3.187*  -  ,004 
(I  .405)  (.003) 
[-.I21  [-.211 
-  1.309  -  ,001 
(2.279)  (.002) 
[-.I81  [-.27*1 
2.185  -  .ooo 
(I  .679)  (.m) 
[-.Ill  [-.I41 
-  ,726  -  .001 
(1.366)  (.001) 
[-.31*1  [-.I61 
-3.919  ,001 
[ -  .32*]  1.071 
(4.45  I)  (.OOI) 
-  13.927* 
(2.706) 
[ -  .43'] 
-6.435: 
(2.712) 




-  1.285 
(I ,624) 
L.211 
-  1.306 
[-.I31 







[ -  ,221 
(I ,529) 
-  I .6S9 
(I ,440) 




.95  I 
(.781) 










.673  -  .498 
(I .OI7) 
L.021 
-  ,324  -  ,242 
(1.203) 
[.I21 
.  I75  -  ,392 
(327) 
1.161 
-  .801  -  .424 
(.695) 
[.29*] 
.047  -  ,223 
(.561) 
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Percentage adults over 25 with four or more years of high school 
in the state. 
Military payroll per capita in the state. 
Value-added in mining per capita in the state 
Population density, population  per square mile in the state. 
Elasticity of  state and local taxes with respect to income. 
Percentage of state population living in urban areas. 
Percentage of housing deteriorated  in the state. 
Years since statehood. 
Percentage of  state residents  who have left the state within the 
past year. 
Percentage of households below poverty level in the state. 
New housing starts per capita within the state. 
Number of local governments per square mile in the state. 
Within-Government  Allocative Efficiency 
Percentage population over 65 in the state. 
Public school children per capita in the state. 
Private school children per capita in the state. 
Percentage of  state residents  who have left the state within the 
past year. 
Percentage of state residents who are black. 
Number of local governments per square mile in the state. 
Annual rate of growth in state income in previous 4 years. 
Population density, population  per capita in the state. 
State and local expenditures per capita in the state. 
Equity 
Coefficient of variation of real state income per family. 
log of real state income per capita. 
Spillovers 
Own Spending 
log of real state own expenditures on highways. 
log of real state own expenditures on welfare. 
efficiency variables  (denoted by  the vector X)  will  differ across aid 
categories as the efficiency rationale differs. Further, two variables- 
income per capita in  the state (denoted as  Y)  and the coefficient of 
variation  in  family  income within the  state (denoted by  CVY)-are 
included to test for the presence of an equity rationale for federal aid. 
Equalizing aid  should be  negatively related to average state income 
and positively related to the coefficient of  variation of income within 
the state."  Each aid regression is of  the general form: 
(1)  AID = {,ox  + rrCVY}yfeu, 
where p, u,  and E are coefficients to be estimated, and u is a randomly 
distributed error term. 47  Federal Assistance and Local Services in the  United States 
The resulting regression coefficients will measure the separate influ- 
ences of the efficiency arguments-via  the X variables-and  the equity 
rationale-via  CVY and  Y-on the distribution of  federal aid across 
states, for each  aid  category in  each  sample  year.  In  effect,  these 
estimates of the AID equation describe the de fucto aid formulas which 
allocate federal aid dollars to state and local governments within each 
aid category. Each year’s sample includes the 48 mainland states. Es- 
timation is by ordinary least squares. To  minimize problems of  simul- 
taneity, all X variables, CVY, and Yare measured so as to predate the 
year in which AID is given. Table 2.4 also reports the simple corre- 
lations of AID with each efficiency and equity proxy  as well  as the 
means and the coefficients of variation of AID itself for each aid cat- 
egory for each of the five sample years. 
Two results are immediately apparent from table 2.4. First, the his- 
torical growth in total real aid per capita observed in tables 2.1-2.3  is 
also observed for each of the individual aid categories specified in table 
2.4: federal-to-state education aid has grown nearly  seven-fold over 
the last three decades, welfare aid by a factor of five, “other” federal- 
to-state aid shows a six-time increase, and federal-to-local government 
categorical aid has increased by almost an order of ten. Only federal- 
to-state highway aid seems to have moderated its growth path, declining 
from a peak of  $30.44 per capita in  1972 (a five factor increase from 
its 1952 level of $6.14 per capita) to $20.86 per capita by  1984. But that 
fall was more than offset by the introduction of federal general revenue 
sharing. Second, and just as important,  such assistance is becoming 
more equally distributed across the 48 mainland states receiving aid. 
Table 2.4 reports the coefficient of  variation in the distribution of  aid 
across states for each aid category for each of the five sample years, 
and without exception the coefficient of variation of aid declines through 
time. At the same time that federal aid is growing, it is also becoming 
more equally distributed across states. 
Is  there  an  economic or public purpose  logic to this  growth  and 
distribution of federal grants-in-aid? Table 2.4 reports both the simple, 
zero-order correlations of the state characteristics  with AID (within 
brackets) and the partial regression coefficients of the characteristics 
and  AID  (with  standard  errors  within  parentheses).  The  resulting 
regression equations are a summary of the federal government’s de 
fucto aid formula and a direct test of how well the effficiency and equity 
arguments do in  describing the actual distribution of aid. In the case 
of federal welfare and highway aid-both  open-ended matching grants 
where the level of AID increases with state-local spending-the  log of 
spending on the aided service is also included in the regressions as a 
characteristic which determines the log of AID. Thus, for these aid 
programs, the state characteristics other than own spending describe 48  Robert P.  Inman 
the implicit matching rate.’*  A key for the variables in table 2.4 defines 
the list of explanatory variables used in AID equation. 
How descriptive of federal aid is the national purpose argument? 
The results are mixed at best. In the case of federal aid for education, 
the variable thought to measure a possible national purpose for edu- 
cational aid is the percentage of adults over the age of  25 with four or 
more years of  high school education (%>HS).  States with a low per- 
centage of educated adults might be allocated more federal education 
aid to promote the national objective of an educated citizenry. If so, 
the variable %>HS ought to have a significant and negative regression 
coefficient. The simple correlations are often significantly negative; 
however, the partial regression correlations are not. Federal education 
aid seems to find the less educated states on average, but not on the 
margin. 
For highway assistance, the often-stated national purpose is the de- 
velopment of an efficient interstate transportation system for times of 
national emergencies, e.g., wars. To test this hypothesis the level of 
military payrolls within the state and the value-added from mining (the 
need for natural resource deployment) are included to explain highway 
assistance. A positive relationship is expected, but it is observed for 
only the simple correlations. 
For welfare assistance to states, %>HS  is again used to proxy for 
a national purpose, the argument here being that in  states with less 
educated adults, income transfers can substitute for human capital and 
perhaps minimize the antisocial consequences often associated with 
abject  poverty.  The regression  coefficients  and  simple correlations 
should be negative; they are, but only rarely significantly so. 
“Other”  federal-to-state assistance is primarily for state infrastruc- 
tures such as sewers, dams, and hospital beds. To insure that all states 
have such an infrastructure even when it may not be feasible to provide 
it  competitively,  the  federal  government  might  offer  national  assis- 
tance. If  so, aid ought to go to the more rural states, measured here 
by the state’s population density. A negative relationship is expected, 
but  never observed. Direct federal aid to local governments is also 
primarily for infrastructures and one might invoke a “save the cities” 
argument  in the  spirit of  Jane Jacobs (1961) as a possible  national 
purpose  rationale  for such  assistance.  Three  variables  are  used  to 
measure the possible importance and status of a state’s urban  envi- 
ronment:  the percentage of  the population that lives in urban areas, 
the percentage of housing that is listed as deteriorated, and the age 
of  the  state  measured  since its  date  of  statehood. There  is  some 
evidence that urban  states get more federal-to-local government as- 
sistance, but it is not the older states and it is not those states with 
deteriorated  housing  stocks. Again,  the evidence for the economic 
argument is mixed at best. 49  Federal Assistance and Local Services in the United States 
Finally, general revenue-sharing aid (GRS) was first introduced under 
the banner of correcting the microeconomic and macroeconomic con- 
sequences of  stagnant state and local tax bases. If this is the purpose 
of GRS, then aid ought to be allocated to those states with the least 
income-responsive tax structures, measured here by the elasticity of 
state and local revenues with respect to state income. The GRS regres- 
sion coefficients and the simple correlations do not show the expected 
negative relationship between GRS and the elasticity of the tax struc- 
ture. On balance, the national purpose arguments do not support the 
observed structure of federal assistance. 
The spillover rationale is no more compelling as a basis for federal 
aid. As an increasing percentage of  a state’s population out-migrates 
(measured by  %OutM in  table  2.4) one can argue that across-state 
spillovers from education, health  care, and  state and local  services 
generally may increase. Thus, states may tend to underprovide such 
services when beneficiaries are planning to leave; grants can correct 
the resulting inefficiency. We  should therefore observe more federal 
education aid and more general revenue-sharing  assistance to states 
with higher rates of out-migration; we do not. 
Within-state  spillovers  or congestion  problems  resulting  from in- 
creased  metropolitanization  may  also be  a problem,  particularly  in 
transportation. Increased highway aid might correct this problem. But 
again the observed distribution of aid is in the wrong direction; as the 
percentage of  the  state’s population  living in  metropolitan  areas in- 
creases, federal highway aid per capita in fact declines. To  minimize 
the adverse spillover effects of  low-income households relocating to 
find higher welfare payments, welfare matching aid should be allocated 
to the states where the poor now reside. The matching rate for welfare 
aid ought to increase with the percentage of the state’s population below 
poverty; surprisingly perhaps, except for 1962, it does not. 
Federal  assistance for states in  the category  “other”  is primarily 
infrastructure aid; such assistance might best be allocated to those high- 
growth states where  environmental  spillovers might  be  most worri- 
some. The variable NHouse-new  housing per square mile in the state- 
shows there is no such relationship. In the same spirit, federal aid to 
local governments should be allocated to those states with many local 
governments per square mile (GDen) so as to overcome the propensity 
of  a highly  decentralized fiscal  system to ignore across-community 
spillovers. In fact, federal categorical assistance to local governments 
is allocated to states with less decentralized fiscal structures. On bal- 
ance, the spillover rationale for aid does little to help us understand 
the actual distribution of federal assistance. 
The final efficiency argument for federal aid would use grants-in-aid 
to correct for a perceivedfuilure  ofthe  local political process to equate 
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costs of producing the local public good (MC);  see, for example, Barlow 
(1970). Such problems can arise for a variety of  reasons.  Collective 
inaction by  the larger majority may allow a better organized minority 
to dictate the local outcomes-for  example, a tax-conscious coalition 
of elderly residents and private school parents might be able to influence 
local school boards to hold spending below the majority’s preferred 
outcome. Federal education aid might then be given to those states and 
school districts where these coalitions are most influential and where 
the  perceived  need for public education is  the  strongest.  From  the 
results in  table 2.4, however, we see federal education aid is  not so 
allocated; states with relatively more elderly (%Old) and more private 
school enrollments (PrKids)  get less aid on average and on the margin. 
In other political settings, minorities may not be able to organize. 
Federal aid might then be used to induce the controlling majority to be 
more responsive to the needs of the weakened minority. For example, 
previous  research on welfare allocations (e.g.,  Orr  1976) has  shown 
blacks are often discriminated against in the distribution of  transfers. 
Thus, more federal welfare assistance might be allocated to states whose 
population has a larger percentage of black residents, all else equal. 
Table 2.4 shows that there is no such pattern. 
The mobility of  voters often creates special problems for the polit- 
ically efficient allocation of state and local public goods. Infrastructure 
allocations-highways,  sewers, sanitation facilities, dams-might  well 
be underprovided in those states and localities from which households 
are most likely to relocate, under the rationale of  consume now and 
let the new residents pay later. Federal aid can be used to offset such 
a beggar-thy-neighbor strategy, with more aid allocated for infrastruc- 
ture development in those states with the highest rates of out-migration 
(%OutM); see, for example, Inman and Albright (1987). Table 2.4 does 
show such an allocation pattern for highway aid and “other” federal 
to  state aid  but  not  for federal  to local categorical  aid. Two other 
variables which measure the need for infrastructures aid-income  growth 
( YGrow) and the number of local governments per square mile (GDenr 
always show an insignificant or an unexpected negative relationship. 
Finally, the new theory of efficient interregional grants (see Boadway 
and Flatters  1982) suggests how aid can be  used to correct another 
problem of resident mobility-the  propensity of individuals to respond 
to the average gains from relocation while ignoring the marginal effects 
such moves may have on overall regional welfare. The result may be 
inefficiently congested public goods facilities in some communities and 
underutilization  in  others,  or overpopulated  regional labor  markets 
elsewhere. To  correct for these inefficient relocations, aid should be 
given: (1) to those regions which have lower natural resource rents per 
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to those regions which have fewer people  so as to induce labor in- 
migration from the other regions; and (3) to those regions which provide 
relatively more  of  still uncongested  public g00ds.l~  To  test  this hy- 
pothesis, revenue-sharing aid was regressed on value-added in mining 
in a state (to approximate for natural resource rents), on the state’s 
population density, and on the level of  state-local spending. Revenue- 
sharing aid is positively related to state and local spending as expected 
but not significantly related to the value-added in mining or to popu- 
lation density. The evidence is weak at best for this efficiency rationale 
for general revenue sharing. 
It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that if one is to find a compelling 
public purpose logic to the present structure of federal aid to state and 
local governments it will have to be on the grounds of economic equity 
not economic efficiency.  In fact, table  2.4 does show an equalizing 
intent to federal assistance, particularly for achieving across-state eq- 
uity. While aid is occasionally allocated more heavily to states with 
larger within-state income variations (CVY,  to achieve within-state ser- 
vice or tax equity), federal aid is almost always inversely related to 
the level of  state  income.  Education aid, highway aid, and federal 
“other” aid in the 1950s and 1960s are the only exceptions. By  1972, 
almost all federal aid is equalizing. 
With this observed equity bias to federal aid, we need to ask the 
next question: How well does such aid do in equalizing across-state/ 
variations in the distribution of meritorious  state-local public goods? 
Are the aid programs’ equalizing intentions realized? Table 2.5 provides 
evidence on this point. For each aid category, the marginal effect of 
another dollar of state income on spending is calculated  based upon 
demand studies for state-local public goods (column  1).  In all cases, 
as residents’ incomes rise, states and localities spend more on state 
and local public services. But  so too do states and localities which 
receive more federal aid; see column 2. If  the poorer income states 
receive more federal aid, then perhaps the increase in federal aid more 
than offsets the propensity of  lower-income states to spend less on 
state and local services. 
Column 3 of table 2.5 shows the effects of one dollar of additional 
income on the receipt of  federal aid; a negative coefficient indicates 
equalizing federal assistance. Column 4 of table 2.5 predicts the effects 
on spending of  this additional amount of  federal aid. If  this equity- 
based  federal aid  does neutralize  the  expenditure effects of  private 
income, then the total effect of a dollar more of income--equal  to the 
own spending effect (column 1) plus the aid offset effect (column 4)- 
should be zero; see column 5.14 If  there is more than a full offset to 
the  spending effects  of  income-Arrow  (1971) provides  some argu- 
ments why this might be desired-then  the total effects of income plus Table 2.5  The Fiscal Equity Performance of  Federal Aid, 1952-1984 
Spending 
Effects  Spending Effects  Change in Aid  with  Spending Effects  Total Effect of 
Federal Aid  State-Local  of $I  of Income  of  $I  of Aid  $1 of Income  of Income via Aid  $I  of Income 
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1957  .9  1.170  + ,001  + .oa  ,020 
1962  ,019  1.170  ~  ,001  -  ,001  ,018 
1972  Infrastructures  .019  1.170  + ,000  + ,000  ,019 
I984  ,019  1.170  + .Ooo  + ,000  ,019 
1914  Infrastructures  ,023  ,865  -  .006  -  ,005  ,018 
I984  ,023  ,865  -  .002  -  ,002  ,021 
2)  Revenue-Sharing 
Notev: 
Column  1:  The spending effects of  $1  of additional state income are from estimates contained in Craig-Inman (1982, tables 1 and 2) for education; 
Craig-Inman (1986, p. 207) for infrastructures; and Craig-Inman (1986, table 7.1) for welfare. 
Column 2:  The spending effects of  $1 of additional federal aid are from estimates contained in Craig-Inman (1982, table 3) for education; Craig- 
lnman (1986. table 7.2) for infrastructures, and Craig-Inman (1986, table 7.2) for welfare. The fact that the marginal effect of $I  of aid is greater 
than $1 .OO for highway and welfare aid is due to the matching provisions implicit in such assistance. 
Column 3:  Calculated from the elasticity estimates (k)  in table 2.4, where dAfDldY = (6) .  (AID/Y).  Calculations for 1972 use the 1972 estimates of 
L and the 1972 (AfDlY)  ratio; calculations for 1984 use the 1984 estimates of 6  and the 1984 (AID/Y) ratio. 
Column 4:  Column (2)  x  Column (3). 
Column 5:  Column (1) + Column (4). 
The notation (n.a.)  for state revenue sharing in  1984 reflects the absence of such assistance in that year. 54  Robert P.  Inman 
aid should be negative in column 5. In only one case does federal aid 
fully neutralize the prospending effects of  state income; that case is 
welfare spending since 1972. For the other aid programs and “merit” 
goods considered herePducation and public infrastructures-federal 
aid is sometimes equalizing but never so equalizing as to neutralize the 
original effects of income. At  best, the current federal aid structure 
reduces 25  percent of  the income generated inequities in  state-local 
spending on education or infrastructures; compare the differences be- 
tween columns 1 and 5 in  table 2.5. While federal aid is a useful step 
toward state-local fiscal equity, table 2.5 suggests it would be hard to 
rationalize the present aid system as a grant structure designed solely 
to promote fairness. 
The final impression left by this dissection of  contemporary federal 
grants to state and local governments is that the actual pattern of federal 
aid does not map closely the usual economic or public purpose argu- 
ments advanced for such assistance.  Perhaps this conclusion  is  not 
surprising.I5 But if it is not good public policy reasoning which describes 
the recent major increase in federal aid for the state and local sector, 
what does? Section 2.3 argues that the answer is to be found not in 
the logic of  normative  economics but  in the workings of  behavioral 
politics. 
2.3  The Political Economy of Federal  Grants 
The pressure to use government to redistribute economic resources 
is endemic to stable democratic societies. Coalitions inevitably form 
around institutions with the power to tax and transfer incomes, and in 
stable democracies that institution is government.I6 Federal grants-in- 
aid are a prime vehicle for such redistributions. It is my hypothesis, 
to be tested here, that the most recent growth of federal assistance to 
state and local governments can be best explained as an exercise in 
redistributive politics. 
The argument proceeds in  two steps. First, with the growth of the 
urban  public economy following World  War  I1 there emerged a new 
and substantial demand for state and local public services. The process 
of suburbanization and the baby boom of the  1950s and early  1960s 
created the need for more schooling and more public infrastructures, 
historically the concerns of  the state and local sectors. Further, sub- 
urbanization created unique fiscal difficulties for our older central cities 
placing additional pressure on the state and local fisc. The net result 
was a growing demand for public services from the state and the local 
sector. Second, as demand increased it was natural  to look for new 
sources of income. The state and local sector was no different, and the 
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locally elected officials-turned  to the only source they could: Wash- 
ington. Washington responded, but not immediately. It took an impor- 
tant shift in institutional structure before additional aid started flowing 
to the state and local sector. That institutional  shift was the decen- 
tralization of congressional decision making over the period 1969-72. 
By  1975, our new federalist fiscal structure was firmly in place. It was 
built by  a growing demand for local services and by  a decentralized 
congressional fiscal process that had discovered the political advan- 
tages of redistributive, centralized financing. 
2.3.1 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 reveal the growth in  resources allocated by the 
state and  local public  sector over this century. The trend  has been 
steadily upward. From 1902 to 1950 the real (1972 dollars) level of state 
and local government  own revenues grew at an annual rate of  2.23 
percent, from $1 15 per capita in  1902 (= $14.76 + $99.81) to $357 per 
capita ($150.83 + $205.82) by  1950; see Table 2.3. Since 1950, growth 
has continued  at an even faster rate; own real revenues of the state 
and local sector have increased at an annual rate of 2.50 percent, rising 
from $357 to $842 dollars per capita (= $472.09 + $370.41) by  1985. 
Federal aid has also grown dramatically over this period, from $43 per 
capita (= $38.18 + $4.53) in  1950 to $191  per capita (= $154.13 + 
$37.23) by  1985 for an annual rate of growth of 4.26 percent. The joint 
effect has been to increase total revenues to the state-local sector by 
2.70 percent per year since 1950, from $400 per capita (=  $357 + $43) 
to $1033 per capita (= $842 + $191). 
The  driving force  behind  this  growth  in  revenues  has  been  the 
increasing demand by residents for services from the state and local 
sector. Equation (2) describes  this growth in  demand  for  state and 
local activities for the period  1948-85.  Specified as a demand  rela- 
tionship, total  state-local government spending per  capita  ( =  state- 
local government expenditures on goods and transfers plus the annual 
fiscal surplus, E  +  S, measured  in  1972 dollars) is  seen to depend 
positively  on last  year’s real  income  (Y-,),  the  previous  year’s ex- 
ogenous (nonmatching) real federal aid per capita (2-,  = total federal 
aid minus welfare and highways aid), the level of  new housing starts 
per capita (NHousc  ,), the number of  school-age children per capita 
(Kids-,),  and the crime rate (Crime-,)  in  the previous year. Expen- 
ditures are also inversely related to the net price of state-local spend- 
ing, defined here as  1  minus the average federal matching rate for the 
previous year [( = fi = (welfare aid  + highway aid)/ E)-  ,)I multiplied 
by  1 minus the average effective federal tax rate of the median income 
taxpayer,  (1 - T), to allow for the federal deductibility of  state and 
local taxes.” 
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(2)  In(E + S) = 1.619 + .243 In  (Y)Ll + .039 In(Z)-, 
(.395)* (.067)* 
-.421  ln((1 - m)(l - 7)  + .042 In(NHouse)L, 
(.176)*  (.O 1 7)  * 
+ .145 In(Kids)L, + .186 In  (Crime).  I 
(  .O I 7)* 
(.049)*  (.022)* 
R2 = .996  D.W. =  1.98 
(Standard errors of coefficient estimates are within parentheses; 
an *  indicates  the coefficient  is  statistically different from 0 at 
least at the .1 level of significance.) 
While the growth in real income has been an important determinant 
of the growth in state and local spending since 1948, the central causes 
behind the increase are to be found in the demographic and structural 
changes that reshaped the local public economy. Estimates of the rel- 
ative contribution of each demand variable to the growth in state-local 
spending reveal that the baby boom (measured by the increase in school- 
aged children per capita), the added difficulties of  urban living (mea- 
sured by  the growth  in  the crime rate), and  the growth  in  personal 
income were the prime forces behind the growth in state-local spending 
during the period  1948-70.  Since 1970 income and urban needs have 
remained  important  determinants of spending growth, but the baby- 
boom  has disappeared as a driving force and has been  replaced  in 
relative importance by the increase in federal grants-in-aid.  The end 
result of these local fiscal dynamics has been a rising state-local tax 
rate (= own state-local  revenueshncome) and a growing  number of 
state and local public employees per capita.I9 The demand for state 
and local services has been rising but at a rate faster than a simple- 
and politically, accommodating-income  effect might justify. Further, 
those with  the most direct vested  interest in  satisfying  these rising 
demands-state  and local public employees-have  been growing too. 
In such instances, it is always easiest for political leaders to look else- 
where for financial support to ease the growing fiscal pressure. Elected 
officials from the state and local sector have proved themselves to be 
no different. Washington was the obvious place to turn. 
2.3.2  Congressional Decentralization  and the 
Growth of Federal Grants 
Congress as an institution for fiscal policy underwent a major trans- 
formation in structure from  1969 to 1972, evolving from a legislative 
body  dominated  by  a  few major  decision-makers  with  firm  control 
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makers each required to maximize his or her own net gain from leg- 
islative decisions. A variety of  factors contributed to this transition: 
the declining influence of political parties, the increasing sophistication 
of voters and their willingness to vote off the party line to favor their 
own interests, and congressional redistricting favoring suburban and 
urban interests to balance the previous rural influence in Congress.20 
For each of  these reasons, the congressional  leadership found itself 
less  and  less  able to dictate  fiscal allocations, and  more  and more 
pressured to be responsive to the demands of all the  These 
demands were often couched in very simple terms: bring home “the 
bacon.”  In this new political environment, to get anything approved 
often meant approval for everything. 
The consequences of this changing congressional structure for fiscal 
policy-and  more specifically for federal grants funding-can be spec- 
ified more formally in a model of representative decision-making within 
alternative legislative structures. An elected representative to Congress 
is assumed to derive political benefits from the provision  of  federal 
government project dollars to his or her constituents (denoted by x, 
paid for example by federal aid), where the level of benefits enjoyed 
will depend on a set of  exogenous characteristics of  the constituents 
(denoted by the vector P):  B  = B(x;  P). The representative bears a 
political cost, however, whenever dollars flow from the district to sup- 
port  federal  expenditures elsewhere. Those  dollars will  typically be 
paid as federal taxes (T)  and are assumed to equal the representative’s 
district’s (s’s)  share (denoted as 4,) of all taxes needed to support all 
project dollars allocated to all of N districts: 
N  N 
T, = 4, c  x,  = m,;  4,, c 4). 
If\ 
The representative’s net political benefits (NPB)  from the allocation 
of federal dollars financed by taxes is therefore: 
(3) 
N 
NPB = B(x,;  P) - T(x,;  4,, 2  x,). 
If, 
The representative is assumed to lobby for a preferred level of x,  for 
the district and to support any legislative coalition which can deliver 
on that preferred allocation. 
Exactly what  that preferred  allocation  will  be,  however,  depends 
fundamentally on how Congress conducts its budgetary business. Three 
alternative legislative regimes-and  the effects of each on a represen- 
tative’s preferred budget-can be specified. The first, called the fully 
decentralized regime, assumes that each legislator selects the district’s 
preferred project size x, under the assumption that marginal changes 
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other legislators. Each legislator then submits his preferred budget- 
denoted x*,( D)  for the decentralized regime-and  all representatives 
vote to simply approve each other’s preferred  x*,~  (D)’s,  where each 
individual X*,~(D  ) is specified from equation (3) by 
dNPB/dx, = 0 , 
or alternatively as 
aB/ax, = b(x,y,  P) = 4,y  = aT/ax, , 
where 4,, is the district’s share of the national taxes in the decentralized 
legislative regime. Figure 2.1 illustrates the preferred district project 
size under the decentralized legislative regime in the very simple case 
where 4,s  equals l/N-that  is, when each of the N  legislative districts 
contributes an average amount to national taxes.22  Since each district 
pays only a small fraction (=  1/N) of  its own project’s costs, the in- 
centive is  to prefer  a much  larger  project  than  if  the  district  were 
responsible for the full marginal costs of  the added project spending 
(= $1): x:(D) > x,;(C)  in figure 2.  I. The fiscal behavior of such decen- 
tralized legislatures is typically called “pork barrel” budgeting. 
The second legislative regime, called a majority-controlled legisla- 
ture, limits pork barrel spending to some extent. Here a single political 
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a budget without granting the excluded minority any unwanted favors. 
Only those legislators in good standing within the majority are certain 
to have their districts’ preferred projects included  within the budget. 
In addition, the dominant majority is run by a strong leadership capable 
of setting majority policy and enforcing that policy on coalition mem- 
bers; in effect, the leadership selects each district’s preferred project 
size based  upon the district’s revealed NPB schedule.  The district’s 
allocation is again set so as to maximize NPB, but now subject to the 
leadership’s realization that each district’s project’s costs will spill over 
onto taxpayers from other districts within the majority coalition. (Proj- 
ect costs which  fall  on taxpayers represented by  the minorities are 
ignored by the majority leadership.) 
The preferred district project is again defined by maximizing equation 
(3): 
dNPBIdx, = 0 
but now 
dBIdx, = b(x,,  P) =  QV  = dTldx, 
defines the optimal project  size, where Q, (= dTldx,) is the relevant 
marginal tax cost of a new project dollar and allows for the spillover 
effects of  spending across districts within the majority coalition.  In 
the simple case in which all  districts  pay  equal taxes, Q, will equal 
MIN or the percentage of majority member districts (of size M)  in the 
full  legislature  (of size Mez3  The size of  each project  in  a  majority 
member district  declines  from what  it  might  have  been  in  a  fully 
decentralized legislature because of the partial internalization of proj- 
ect costs achieved by strong majority coalition leadership; see Figure 
2.1 where xf (M) < x:(D) because QT  > +c.24 
The final legislative regime, called a cooperative legislature, employs 
a single political leader, representing  a coalition of the whole, to set 
each district’s allocation for x,.  The cooperative regime fully internal- 
izes all fiscal spillovers that result from centralized financing. In this 
regime, each district receives that project size which equates the mar- 
ginal political benefits of x, to the full marginal costs of x,: b( x, P) = 
1. The resulting project size in each district is x:(C)  in Figure 2.1 ;  x:(C) 
is each legislator’s preferred budget if he or she can be certain that all 
other legislators will cooperate. To  achieve the fully cooperative bud- 
get, the political leader of the coalition of the whole must be capable 
of punishing those individual legislators who seek to deviate from this 
allocation  by  free riding  on the system of  centralized  financing and 
setting their own x, > xf(C).  Such punishment  might entail branding 
the renegade a “budget-buster’’  and then working for his defeat in the 
next  legislative  election.  Only  when  the  leader  has  sufficient  re- 60  Robert P.  Inman 
sources-financial  or otherwise-to  make this punishment credible can 
the fully cooperative allocation be sustained. 
The size of the total project budget (denoted C)  will be equal to the 
sum of  all district allocations and can be  specified for each of these 
three legislative regimes. In the case of the fully decentralized legis- 
lature, each district receives its preferred project of size x,;  (D);  the 
total budget will  therefore equal G(D) = 2 x:(D).  In the case of the 
fully cooperative regime each district receives its cooperative allocation 
xf(C); the final budget is therefore G(C) = 2 x:(C).  For the majority 
rule regime the overall project budget will equal the sum of all majority 
members’ projects-2  x:(M),  where M  is the size of the rnajority- 
plus any project spending allocated by the majority to minority districts. 
Allocations to the minority for projects of type x need not be zero. But 
any minority spending which does occur will only occur if  it improves 
the welfare of  the majority. This may  well  be  the case if  there are 
policies of interest to the fiscal majority which demand the cooperation 
of a minority for approval-.g.,  filibuster overrides or treaty approvals 
that require a super-majority. Cooperation can be purchased by granting 
the minority a level of spending on projects of type x. The most cost- 
effective bribe is that which maximizes the political surplus to a mi- 
nority member without  imposing political costs on the majority. This 
will be a project of size x*(C), the allocation of which maximizes the 
political surplus available in  trade to the majority coalition. If  we as- 
sume such trades do in fact occur, then the budget for expenditure on 
projects of  type x  will  be  the sum of  all  projects given to majority 
members plus the sum of all projects supplied to minority members or 
G(M) =  xz(M) +  2  xf(C). Together the three legislative re- 
gimes define three alternative budgets for project spending. Specified 
in increasing order of total outlays they are 
N 
s=  I 
N 
s  = I 
scM 
SEM  s€(N-  M) 
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As characterized above, the recent transformation of congressional 
decision-making in the early 1970s marks a shift from majority-controlled 
fiscal politics to fiscal allocations based upon fully decentralized bud- 
geting. No longer are budgets packaged in a dictatorial fashion by  the 
majority’s chosen chairmen  of  the  Ways and  Means,  Finance, and 
Appropriations Committees. In the new Congress, it has been argued, 
budgets emerge from the process of give and take in the numerous 
subcommittees and caucuses of the House and Senate. The behavioral 
implications of  such a change are threefold:  (1) the aggregate level of 
project spending should expand from G(M)  to G(D);  (2) spending across 
congressional districts and the states should become more equalized 
as previous minority districts receive more project support; and (3) the 
absolute number of legislated projects and programs should expand to 
accommodate the specific needs of each legislative district. 
Federal grants to state and local governments provides one case study 
in which to look for these consequences of  the congressional trans- 
formation. At least on the surface the evidence is supportive. First, 
the aggregate level of  federal grants to state and local governments 
showed a noticeable  upturn around  1970, particularly in  federal aid 
paid directly to local governments; see table 2.3. Second, the overall 
distribution of aid has become more equal across states as measured 
by the decline in the coefficient of variation in the distribution of aid; 
see table 2.4. Further,  1972 seems to stand as a key turning point in 
this downward  trend.25 Finally, the  simple number of  aid programs 
passed by Congress increased dramatically in the late  1960s and the 
early 1970s, rising from 160 programs in 1962 to 412 by  1976.26  It seems 
clear that the structure of  congressional decision making has had an 
important influence on the level and structure of our grants system. 
We  can make these observations more precise and estimate quan- 
titatively the influence of congressional structure on the level of federal 
support for the state-local sector. The three-regime legislative model 
specified in equation (4) can also be written in “nested”  form as 
.v  = I  J = I 
where the dummy variable p.  =  1 if the legislature is majority-rule and 
0 otherwise and the dummy variable 6 = 1 if  the legislature is decen- 
tralized and 0 otherwise. The default regime (p. = 6 = 0) is the fully 
cooperative model of budgeting. Estimation of equation (5) requires a 
specification of x,‘(C) and the increments [x,’(M) - x:(C)]  and [xf(D) 
-  x,’(C)]. Each can be defined from knowledge of the marginal political 
benefit schedule and from district tax shares under the fully cooperative 62  Robert P.  Inman 
(= l), the majority rule (= CP,), and the decentralized ( = +,) legislative 
regimes; see Figure 2. I. 
The marginal political benefit schedule for grants in aid, b(x, P), is 
assumed to depend upon the demand for state-local public goods within 
the district. The political benefits from grants is expected to increase 
with the effective burden of state and local own revenues on income 
(RIY),  new housing starts in the district (NHouse), the number of school- 
age children  (Kids), the  crime rate  in  the district  (Crime), and  the 
number of  state-local employees per capita.  The burden  represents 
fiscal pressure on the state-local sector while housing starts, school- 
age children, and the crime rate each indicate a special need which 
might  engender added  assistance.  State-local employees per  capita 
(SLEmp) measure the size of  the most likely organized lobby which 
can express these needs in Wa~hington.~’  Together the variables (RIY, 
NHouse, Kids, Crime, and SLEmp define the vector P of b(x,P). The 
marginal benefits of grants are assumed to increase with each variable. 
District  tax  shares under the majority  rule  and  the  decentralized 
legislative regimes are assumed to equal MIN (=  &)  and 1/N (= &) 
respectively, where M/N  is the percent of the legislature in the majority 
coalition and N is the total size of  the legislature.  For this analysis, 
the  majority  coalition’s  share is  taken  to be  the  percentage of  the 
House of Representatives controlled by the dominant party, whether 
Republican or Democrat. While these measures of tax shares are not 
precisely  correct  for each  district,28 the degree of  error in  this ap- 
proximation is likely to be small, and certainly of  second order im- 
portance  when  defining  the  relevant  increments,  [x:(M) - 
Assuming that the marginal benefit schedule is a linear function of 
the vector P (= RIY, NHouse, Kids, Crime, SLEmp),  thenxf(C),  xf(M), 
and x:(D)  will also be linear functions of P and their corresponding tax 
shares-1,  MIN, and  1/N re~pectively.~~  Assuming further  that  the 
political benefit schedules are structurally identical across districts ex- 
cept for variations in P and that elected representatives define all ben- 
efits and costs in  per  capita (=  per  vote) units, then  the aggregate 
spending equation in (5) can be respecified in  per capita units as 
xXC)1 and [xW) - xXO1. 
(6)  g  = x*(I,  P) + G(M)[k  . (M/N)J  + G(D)  [SJ + v , 
where g is federal aid per capita, x*(  1 ,P) is the per capita demand for 
aid when the district tax share is  1  and when the elements of P assume 
their  national average values  [= x*(l, P) = xf(C;  P)], G(M)  is the 
average increase in  per capita grants spending in  districts within the 
majority coalition as the legislative regime shifts from cooperative to 
majority-rule,  and G(D)  is the average increase in per capita grants 
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erative to a decentralized structure.30  With the addition of an assumed 
additive error term [denoted as v in (6)1, equation (6) becomes the basis 
for an econometric analysis of recent federal grants spending. 
Parameter estimates from equation (6) will define the coefficients of 
the linear political benefit schedule as well as the marginal effects of 
any  congressional  regime  shifts, from  cooperative  to majority  rule 
[Z(M)]  or from cooperative to fully decentralized [G(D)].  From the 
coefficient estimates of Z(M)  and G(D) we  can also estimate  the 
effects on grants spending of the shift from a majority rule to a decen- 
tralized  Congress.  It is  necessary, however,  to specify a priori  the 
periods which define the alternative legislative regimes (i.e., p and 6). 
Congressional scholars generally describe the period from 1948 to 1968 
as an example of strong party leadership in fiscal affairs; see Fenno 
(1966) and Manley (1970). The period from 1972 to today is generally 
characterized by decentralized legislative decision-making; see Shepsle 
and Weingast (1984). The years 1969-72  marked the period of  transi- 
tion; see Ornstein (1975). For this analysis, the majority rule dummy 
variable p  is assigned a value of  1 for the years 1948-71,  and a value 
of 0 otherwise. The decentralized legislative regime is represented by 
a value of 6 equal to 1 for the years 1972 onward; for all previous years 
6 = 0. To minimize problems of simultaneity all elements of the vector 
are lagged one year. Estimation of equation (6) also allows for the 
possibility of first-order serial correlation in  the additive error terms 
(represented  by  p, the  correlation coefficient between  ut and  ut - I). 
Estimation  is based  upon  data for the  period  1948-85.  Results are 
reported in table 2.6. 
The initial specification in  equation (a) of  table 2.6 assumes that 
Congress has been uniformly responsive to constituent demands over 
the period  1948-85;  the specification in equation (b) tests for the ad- 
ditional effects of  congressional structure on  aid  spending.  In  both 
specifications the individual coefficients measuring the political benefits 
of aid-vector  P-show  that federal aid increases as the fiscal burden 
of state-local finance increases, as the number of school-aged children 
increases, and as state-local employees per capita rise. The crime rate 
and  new  housing  starts are never  significant, at least beyond their 
influence on fiscal pressure, (RIY,_  I; see equation (2) above. What is 
particularly impressive is the statistically significant and quantitatively 
important role that state-local public employees play in the determi- 
nation of federal aid; congressional spending is quite responsive to the 
growing size of  this interest group. The elasticity of aid with respect 
to (SLEmp)_  I  is 2.16, more than twice the elasticities of aid with respect 
to (RIY-,  (= Sl),  NHouse-  I  (= .07), or Kids-  I  (= 36). 
As important as constituent demand and interest group representa- 
tion has been to the recent growth in federal aid, so too has been the Table 2.6  The Political Economy of Federal Aid 
Constituent  Demand  Congress  Reagan 
Root 
Model  Intercept  (Rln-,  NHoirsc,   kid^  Crirn<,-l  SLErnp-,  p(M/N)  6  Year  p  MSE  E2 
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structural shifts in congressional fiscal politics; see equations (b) and 
(c) in table 2.6. Equation (b) is the basic specification of the budget 
model; equation (c) extends that specification to test for a “Reagan- 
Stockman” effect on aid spending. An F  - test for the joint significance 
of  the two congressional  variables-p(M/l\r)  and &rejects  the null 
hypothesis of no effect at the  10 percent level of significance in both 
equations. Further, the congressional structure variables influence fed- 
eral aid as predicted. The coefficients on p( M/N)-Z(M)  = $51.46 
in equation (b) and $45.41 in equation (c)-measure  the average increase 
in per capita aid in a majority rule district as Congress moves from a 
fully cooperative to a majority rule regime. The coefficients on 6 
Z(D)  = $61.42 in equation (b) and $59.01 in equation (c)-measure 
the average increase in  the preferred level of aid spending in  every 
district  as Congress shifts from the cooperative to the decentralized 
regime. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the effects of these congressional structures on 
federal  grants  spending,  based  upon  the  econometric  estimates  of 
Z(M>  and Z(D)  from equation (c) and actual federal aid expenditures 
for calendar  1974, one of the first aid budgets to be decided by the 
newly decentralized Congress. Total grants spending in 1974 in an av- 
erage congressional district equalled $179 per capita, an estimate of 
x*(D)  for that year. The estimate of Z(D)  = $59/capita from equation 
=  $1 
=  (ljS 
I  I  n  =  4s 
$120  $165  ‘$179 
Fig. 2.2 
Project Size 
($  Per Capita) 
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(c) implies the level of  the cooperative budget in the average district 
would  have  been  $120  per  capita  (=x*(C)  = x*(D) - Z(D)).  The 
estimate of G(M)  from equation (c) implies that the average district's 
majority-rule budget-if  a member of  the majority-would  have ex- 
ceeded its cooperative budget by  --  $45 per capita; therefore the ma- 
jority-rule budget for a majority coalition district would have been $165 
per capita (=x*(M)  = x*(C) + hx(M)).  Together these estimates imply 
that the shift from majority-rule to decentralized fiscal politics increased 
the size of  the federal grants budget in an average majority coalition 
district by  $14 per capita. 
The real dollar gains from decentralization accrue to those districts 
previously excluded from the majority coalition. In 1974 the Democrats 
controlled 55  percent of the  House seats and, for this analysis, are 
assumed to constitute the majority coalition. Under decentralized bud- 
geting, the remaining 45 percent of congressional districts now move 
alongside the original majority to capture x*(D)  as well. As assumed 
under the model's original specification, these minority districts would 
have received initially only x*(C) from the majority. The effect of the 
decentralization of  budgetary politics is to therefore allocate an addi- 
tional $59 per capita in federal aid (= &(D) = x*(D) - x*(C)) to the 
average minority district. Overall, the econometric model predicts that 
under decentralized budgeting grants-in-aid spending rose by  an av- 
erage of $34 per capita (= .55  x  $14 + .45 x  $59), or by  24 percent, 
over what it might have been had Congress remained a strong majority- 
rule fiscal institution (= $145  = .55  x x*(M)  + .45 x  x*(C) = .55  x 
$165  + .45 x  $120). 
This trend towards increased aid spending continued throughout the 
1970s and into 1981, but the period  1982 to 1985 showed another sig- 
nificant break  in  the pattern. Now  the trend  turned downward; see 
equation (c). The explanation lies in the Reagan-Stockman budgets of 
those years.31  As fashioned by David Stockman, the 1982-85  Reagan 
budgets  were  an effort to internalize  the fiscal externalities created 
under decentralized congressional budgeting and to move, if possible, 
towards the cooperative allocation, x:(C),  based  upon a coalition of 
the whole.  The strategy was to join  across-the-board  spending cuts 
with a general reduction  in  taxes-just  what the cooperative budget 
would require.32  Reagan provided the leadership-and  the political arm- 
twisting-needed  to guide such budgets through a Congress committed 
to decentralized fiscal politics.33  For each of the first four Reagan budget 
years-represented  by a year dummy variable in equation (c)-real  aid 
spending was reduced from what it might have been had full decen- 
tralized congressional budgeting prevailed. Aggregate aid spending was 
reduced initially by  $28 per capita in 1982 and finally by $43 per capita 
in  1985, a  15  percent to 22 percent reduction  when compared to the 67  Federal Assistance and Local Services in  the United States 
1981 aid expenditures of $194 per capita, the last pre-Reagan budget. 
The Reagan budgets appear to have returned us to just about where 
we would have been in total aid financing had Congress remained under 
firm majority-rule leadership. 
This analysis  of  the  budgetary  effects  of  congressional  reform  is 
complicated however by  one important fact. While  1972 was the op- 
erative date of  transition  to decentralized fiscal politics within Con- 
gress, it also marks the date of  passage of a major new aid program, 
the  State and  Local  Fiscal  Assistance Act of  1972. Also known  as 
General Revenue Sharing (GRS), this program infused into the state 
and local public sector an average of $22 per capita in new grants; see 
table 2.4. Given the coincidence of GRS funding and the emergence 
of decentralized budgeting, it could well be that the results in equations 
(b) and (c)-which  have been attributed to the new structure of  fiscal 
politics-are  in fact due to the passage of GRS. A “clean” test of the 
structural reform hypothesis would  reestimate equations (b) and (c) 
using all aid other than GRS assistance as the dependent variable. 
A further refinement of  the analysis should also be considered. As 
large formula grants tied to state and local spending, federal welfare 
aid via AFDC and Medicaid grants may also obscure the true effects 
of  reforms in congressional structures. A preferred test for the effects 
of reform might omit these grants from the dependent variable as well. 
What will remain are all the many small grant programs which provide 
assistance to the state-local sector for education, health care, and public 
infrastructures-programs  which together still totalled $125 per capita 
or more in grants in the 1970s. Equation (d) provides this refined test 
and reestimates the structural aid model using as the dependent variable 
total aid less GRS and welfare grants. The results are nearly identical 
to those achieved earlier, and, if anything, are slightly stronger.34  The 
basic conclusion remains in force: the new, decentralized structure of 
congressional fiscal politics has been an important stimulus to the level 
of federal grants spending. 
2.4  Conclusion 
From its inception, the U.S. public economy has been committed to 
the principle of fiscal decentralization. Appropriately designed, such a 
system can make a significant contribution  to the twin goals of  eco- 
nomic efficiency and economic equity. A potentially important part of 
that structure are intergovernmental grants-in-aid. This paper has ex- 
amined the  recent evolution of  our federal  grants system from two 
perspectives.  First, can the  present  system of  federal  assistance  to 
state and local governments be  rationalized  by  the usual normative 
economic arguments for efficency and equity in the provision of local 68  Robert P.  Inman 
public services: Does such aid  provide national public goods, or in- 
ternalize externalities across  jurisdictions, or overcome internal failings 
of  local fiscal choice, or insure a more equitable provision of  merito- 
rious public goods? Second, if not, then what does explain the structure 
of our federal aid system? 
Against the usual efficiency arguments for aid, there is little evidence 
in  the present structure of federal assistance that current aid is moti- 
vated  from that perspective.  There  is more  evidence to support an 
equity foundation for federal grants, at least to equalize the across- 
state distribution of meritorious public services. Yet  with the possible 
exception of welfare aid, such assistance has had only a marginal effect 
on the final distribution  of  state-local public goods. If we are to ra- 
tionalize the  present  structure of  federal grants, therefore,  it would 
appear that we should look to arguments other than those based on 
achieving economic efficiency or equity. 
An alternative rationale, based upon a model of redistributive poli- 
tics, was advanced and tested for the period  1948-85.  The observed 
growth in federal grants-in-aid over this period proved consistent with 
the underlying structure of this model. Aid has grown with increasing 
fiscal pressure on the state and local sector. The baby boom, the process 
of  suburbanization, and the emergence of the fiscally troubled central 
city have all contributed to the demand for federal assistance. Congress 
has been responsive to these demands; particularly  so, following the 
institutional reforms of  1969-72.  Those reforms have opened the pro- 
cess of congressional budgeting to decentralized negotiations and deal- 
making. When coupled with a national tax  system which shares the 
costs of local expenditures across all legislative districts, the result is 
a budgeting process for federal grants which is potentially biased to- 
wards over-spending. The empirical results presented here (see figure 
2.2) suggest that the present congressionally determined aid budgets 
may be inflated by as much as $34 per person, or 24 percent, over what 
they might have been had strong majority-rule leadership remained in 
force, and they may be as much as $59 per capita, or 50 percent, larger 
than what all legislators might prefer were they capable of achieving a 
fully cooperative fiscal allocation. 
What can be done to control this apparently excessive aid spending? 
Short of a constitutional amendment to limit grants spending, there is 
really only one solution: stronger and more effective fiscal leadership 
in  Congress. The Reagan-Stockman budgets of  1982-85  revealed the 
potential  influence such leadership could have on spending, but the 
resulting cuts seem to have been a unique, and perhaps short-lived 
event. Attempts to institutionalize such reductions by means of Rea- 
gan’s New Federalism reforms never received serious consideration 
by Congress; the passage in the winter of  1987, over Reagan’s veto, 69  Federal Assistance and Local Services in  the United States 
of new highway and clean water grants only underscores the point.35 
The basic message of  this analysis is clear: as long as congressional 
budgeting remains a decentralized fiscal process, the incentives to fi- 
nance centrally, and to spend locally, will remain as well. Our current 
system of federal grants to state and local governments is just one 
logical outcome of this process. 
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partment. Elected state-local officials  have also organized as lobby groups in 
Washington, and perhaps more than any other organizations were responsible 
for the passage of General Revenue Sharing; see Beer (1976). 
28. To  be so, all districts must pay the same amount in federal taxes; see n. 
23 above. 
29.  A linear marginal benefit schedule of the form h(x,P) = a,, -  + 
ZpjPj,,  defines a linear demand curve for x  when b(x, P) is  set equal to the 
marginal tax cost of x  under the alternative legislative regimes. For the fully 
cooperative regime, b(x, P)  =  1 defines  x:(C)  as x:(C)  = (ads,) - (I/al)l + 
X(pj/al)Pj,,;  for the majority rule regime: x,:(M) = (a,,/aI)  - (l/a,)+,  + C(pj/ 
al)P,,,;  and for the decentralized  regime: x.:(D) = (atJal)  - (l/al)+,  + C(pj/ 
a  I )P,.,  . 
30.  More  formally,  the  specification  in  equation  (6)  implies  z(U)  = 
&,,(D)(Pop,,/ZPop,,)  and K(M)  = 2 ~,(M)(PO~,~/~  PO~,~)(~M/~N), 
where z,JD)  x,:(D2_ x:(C),  g(M)  = x,y(M) - x:(C),  Pop,v  is the population 
in  district  s,  and PopM  and PopN are average population  sizes for majority 
districts and all districts respectively. For most purposes it seems reasonable 
N 
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to assume (PopMfiN)  =  1 ;  thus &(M)  is an  estimate of the average increase 
in per capita aid in majority coalition districts. 
31. Aid  spending in calendar year 1982 was defined largely by the budget 
for fiscal  year  1982, ending on 30 September 1982. The FY 1982 budget was 
approved during the calendar year 1981  and reflects the policies of the first 
year of the Reagan administration. 
32. The Reagan-Stockman  budget  strategy is  well  described in  Stockman 
(1986), particularly chapter 5. 
33. The important role of the president in the passage of the Reagan budgets 
is described in Stockman (1986), particularly chapter 6. 
34. The results for a regression of total  aid minus only GRS funding are 
similar to those in equations (c) and (d) of table 2.6, though the estimates for 
the congressional coefficients are not as precise. While it is reasurring that all 
these alternative specifications give the same conclusion, there are good rea- 
sons to embrace equation (c) using total  aid  expenditures as the preferred 
specification. Beer’s (1976) review of the passage of GRS makes clear that it 
was largely decentralized  congressional fiscal  politics  which defined the aid 
formula and the levels of assistance. Stockman’s discussion of the attempts to 
trim welfare and Medicaid assistance show that the same incentives dominate 
these programs as well; see Stockman (1986) at the index references for AFDC 
and Medicaid and at p. 442, particularly. 
35.  For a discussion of the political  fate of the New Federalism,  see the 
Nafional  Journal (1982). In the appendix to his book on Reagan budget policies, 
Stockman reviews the final record of his efforts to trim the federal aid budget 
and concludes that while some progress has been made, it may not be per- 
manent: “Every big program and every piddling program that marched out of 
the Cutting Room dead or bleeding in  February  1981  lived to tell  about it.” 
And both Republicans and Democrats in Congress were on the “first-aid team.” 
Stockman (1986, p. 442). The recent veto overrides suggest a revival may be 
coming. 
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Comment  Thomas Romer 
The central message of  Inman’s paper is that, as with other types of 
government spending, pork barrel considerations have played an im- 
portant-perhaps  dominant-role  in the development of federal grants 
to state and local governments. This would not surprise political sci- 
entists (who, if anything, have overemphasized “distributive politics” 
as the basis of government spending), but may come as a mild shock 
to some economists. 
Part of the empirical support for Inman’s claim rests on a series of 
cross-sectional estimates for various types of  grants (table 2.4 in  the 
paper). These results reveal only sporadic association between real per 
capita federal aid to lower-level governments in each state and variables 
that might plausibly capture efficiency-based motivations for such grants. 
One might argue that a more convincing analysis would use more dis- 
aggregated data and a wider range of explanatory variables, but these 
findings are intriguing and pose a clear challenge to those who would 
propose efficiency as the basis of a positive theory of grant structure. 
Inman ties much of  his discussion of  the growth of  aid to a claim 
that a structural shift in  Congress was central to a major shift in the 
structure of federalism and, in particular, led to a dramatic increase in 
federal grants after 1972. 
Looking at the time series on federal grants in a bit more detail than 
that given in the paper is helpful here. Table C2.1 shows year-to-year 
growth  in  real per capita federal grants to states and localities. The 
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Table CZ.1  Federal Grants to State and Local Governments, Year-to-Year 
Percentage Changes, 1948-1983” 
Fiscal  %Change From  Fiscal  %Change From  Fiscal  %Change From 
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Sources: Computed from U.S.  Department of the Treasury Office of State and Local Fi- 
nance, 1985, Federal-Srare-Local Fiscal RPlations,Table 111.10. p. 65. 
“1972 dollars per capita. 
pattern is not so much one of steady growth followed by an explosion 
after 1972 as it is one consisting of a series of explosions. The major 
episodes correspond to what might be viewed as innovations in the use 
of federal grants. The late 1950s’ boom is largely due to funding pur- 
suant to the 1956 Interstate Highway Act. In the next decade there is 
the use of federal grants to  fund the programs associated with the Great 
Society, especially transfer programs  but with  a liberal sprinkling of 
public works projects thrown in. There was indeed another explosion 
in  the  early  197Os, culminating in  the advent of  General  Revenue- 
Sharing, but by the second half of the Carter administration  real per 
capita federal grants began to decline-before  the advent of the newest 
“new federalism.” 
Each of  these explosions  represents substantial  real  increases in 
federal outlays. My strong hunch is that, given the dynamics shown in 
my  table, the linear  specification  in  Inman’s table 2.6 is unlikely  to 
capture correctly the political  effects he is  looking for. Rather than 
pointing to a dramatic shift of spending after 1972, the estimated coef- 
ficients of 6 reported in table 2.6 reflect the cumulative upward  shift 
of the intercept of these linear specifications over the previous 15 years. 
An indication that the quantitative results should be viewed with some 
skepticism is evident from figure 2.2. The coordinates indicated there 
clearly cannot all lie on a linear marginal benefit schedule. Taking the 
project sizes and costs corresponding  to x*(C)  and Y(M)  as given would 
suggest that  +s  = .41 if  we agree that x*(D) = $179. This, in  turn, 
seems not very different from what might emerge from the simple pork 76  Robert P.  Inman 
barrel model under a modest decentralization. (In a way, my calculated 
value of 4, is somewhat reassuring, since +, = 11435  along this linear 
marginal benefit function would require x*(D)  = $220 per capita!) 
All  the  same, I  think  more detailed  investigation  of  the political 
economy of federalism will  bear out Inman’s central message. Here, 
even more than with the work  on efficiency aspects of  grants, more 
disaggregation  and  attention to the dynamics of grant  amounts and 
types is  likely  to be revealing.  Some tantalizing evidence about the 
“Christmas tree” aspects of federal grants comes from data reported 
in Inman’s table 2.4. There we see that across states, for each type of 
grant, the coefficient of variation in real per capita federal grants de- 
creases over time, at least up to the  1980s. This is  equally  true for 
categories where the mean was increasing (as with “other”  grants to 
states) and those where the mean flattened out or declined by  1977 
(welfare or highways). 
For the most part, this tendency toward more equal distribution of 
federal grants across states (and, as more detailed data show, across 
congressional districts) has been accomplished by the shift from mostly 
categorical grants toward greater reliance on broad-based block grants 
using formulas carefully calibrated to provide for “equitable”  distri- 
bution across states. It is this shift, rather than an especially dramatic 
change in the volume of grants, that I think is the hallmark of the move 
toward the congressional decentralization that figures so prominently 
in Inman’s account. 
The 1980s have witnessed a substantial retrenchment in the use of 
federal grants. The real declines shown in table C2.1 and implicit in 
the Reagan dummies of table 2.6 are part of an even more  striking 
development. Grants-in-aid as a proportion of total nondefense outlays 
by the federal government rose steadily from 1950 to about 22 percent 
in 1970, and hovered around that figure through 1978. From then, grants 
became the most expendable part of the domestic budget. By the end 
of the first Reagan term, grants-in-aid to state and local governments 
represented only 16  percent of federal domestic budget outlays-a lower 
fraction than the corresponding 1960 figure. (Aronson and Hilley 1986, 
table 3-1, p. 49.) 
The cuts in the first Reagan term reflect the fact that, for the most 
part, these grants were  “budget  items . . . subject  to discretionary 
reductions by the president and Congress without changes in existing 
law, and thus [were] exceptionally vulnerable to a president determined 
to cut federal spending.” (Palmer 1984, 53.) Nonetheless, the congres- 
sional incentives discussed by  Inman are, if  anything,  stronger now 
than they were in the early ’70s. Moreover, federal grants (the fewer 
strings attached the better) are a politically delightful revenue source 
from the viewpoint of  state and local governments. (Much better than 77  Federal Assistance and Local Services in the United States 
indirect gains from reductions in federal taxes, for example.) These 
considerations suggest that the next “new” federalism will also be the 
next “explosion” in grants-in-aid. 
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